Ambiguity Attitudes and Incentivised Belief Elicitation
I am a PhD candidate working on microeconomic theory and behavioural economics.
Advisors: Duarte Gonçalves, Ran Spiegler
Research
Work in progress
Mediated Evidence Disclosure
Abstract
A sender, with some probability, is informed about the underlying state and strategically discloses the state in order to induce a desirable action from the receiver. The disclosure is done through a mediator, who can only pass on the information when the state is disclosed by the sender. The mediator is publicly known to have its own agenda and aims to induce a different action. Upon receiving the (potentially null) information, a receiver chooses an action to match the state. We show that the existence of a mediator weakly benefits the sender. In particular, when the sender's and the mediator's targets are on the opposite side of the prior expectation, the sender can achieve the optimal ex-ante payoff in equilibrium. Further, the existence of a mediator weakly reduces the information transmitted.Teaching
| Course | Year | Materials |
|---|---|---|
| Microeconomic Theory (Graduate) | 2026-2027 | Tutorial Notes |
| Economics of Information (Undergraduate) | 2023-2026 | |
| Behavioural Economics (Undergraduate) | 2021-2022 |